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Summary  
Individuals are more frequently having recourse to assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART) to realize their desire for offspring. Where they do so, they may choose to fertilize 
their gametes and implant the resultant embryos immediately, or they may choose to 
freeze their embryos for later use. The latter option brings with it greater potential for 
legal disputes as relationships terminate, parties change their minds, and disagreements 
arise regarding the fate of frozen embryos. This article, therefore, examines the South 
African legal framework for addressing disputes involving frozen embryos. The aim is to 
assess whether the current legal framework is adequate, and whether lessons can be 
learnt from other jurisdictions faced with similar legal disputes. 
 
1 Introduction  
Any relationship in which individuals decide to bring a child into the world entails some 
level of introspection. This decision is further accompanied by an awareness that, once 
the child is born, the other party becomes a permanent fixture in one’s life.1 This is the 
case regardless of whether procreation occurs sexually or artificially.2 However, as is the 
case with any relationship, there is no guarantee that it will last. This is evident from the 
number of divorces finalized each year.3 And in each of those instances where children are 
involved, the process of deciding their fate makes matters a lot more complex and often 
comes with varying emotions and arguments about what is in their best interests. In some 
instances individuals are able to reach harmonious outcomes on their own, while in 
others it is left for a court to decide what is best for the children concerned. The advent of 
assisted-reproductive technologies (ART) has not improved matters. In fact, an already 
complex matter becomes more complicated by the existence of cryopreservation of 
gametes and embryos.4 Now, instead of having to decide the fate of an existing child or 
                                                 
1  This excludes those instances where a donor is involved. In this instance according to s 40(3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
such individuals acquire no responsibilities, rights, duties or obligations in respect of the child.   
2  Although it is arguable that the decision to procreate artificially is accompanied by additional considerations, given the process 
involved in becoming pregnant. Some of these considerations include: whether use will be made of donor gametes or surrogacy or 
whether to use fertility treatment in the hope of falling pregnant oneself.   
3 Statistics SA in their 2014 report on Marriages and Divorces found that 150 852 civil marriages, 3 062 customary marriages and 1 
144 civil unions were solemnized in 2014; in the same year, 24 689 people got divorced. This is 3,4% higher than in 2013. See 
Statistics South Africa “Marriages and Divorces 2014” 9 February 2016 http://www.statssa. 
gov.za/publications/P0307/P03072014.pdf (accessed 2016-08-16) 5.   
4 Cryopreservation is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as “[t]he freezing or vitrification and storage of gametes, zygotes, embryos 
or gonadal tissue”. See WHO “The International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive Technology (ICMART) and the World Health 
 
2 
 
children, couples who have undergone ART and have opted to freeze their embryos for 
future use, are more frequently being caught up in legal disputes about the fate of their 
frozen embryos upon the termination of their relationship.5 This was the case for actress 
Sofia Vergara of Modern Family fame and her erstwhile fiancé, Nick Loeb. What had 
started out as the decision of a couple in love, ended in a legal battle for custody of their 
joint embryos.  
 
While such a case has not yet presented itself before any South African court,6 it is 
inevitable, given the increased use of ART for procreation purposes. 7  This article, 
therefore, examines the South African legal framework for addressing disputes involving 
frozen embryos, in particular the impact of section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) on this issue. The aim is to critically assess 
whether the current legal response is adequate, or whether lessons can be learnt from 
other jurisdictions faced with similar legal disputes. In order to achieve this objective, this 
article considers the Vergara-Loeb saga, it provides a brief introduction to ART, and 
thereafter it will examine the South African legal framework, as well as foreign responses 
to the problem. The article then concludes by making recommendations for the way 
forward. 
 
2 A background to the vergara-loeb saga  
The saga which erupted in the United States of America (USA) between Sofia Vergara and 
Nick Loeb serves as what is fast becoming a classic example of how cryopreservation of 
embryos can become problematic.8 In this instance Ms Vergara and Mr Loeb had been in 
a relationship, and had opted to fertilize their gametes and cryopreserve the resultant 
embryos. Sometime later, their relationship broke down and a dispute arose regarding the 
future of the embryos. Mr Loeb proceeded to sue Ms Vergara for custody of the embryos. 
He sought to rescind the agreement that they had entered into, which stipulated that the 
embryos could only be used with the consent of both parties. Mr Loeb argued that the 
agreement was invalid as it failed to stipulate what should happen in the event of their 
relationship dissolving. 9  Surprisingly, this feature is absent in many agreements 
concluded with fertility clinics.10  
                                                                                                                                                                
Organization (WHO) Revised Glossary on ART Terminology, 2009” 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/infertility/art_terminology.pdf (accessed 2016-03-14).   
5 MacElree Harvey Attorneys “The Legal Uncertainty Surrounding the Disposition of Frozen Embryos in American Divorce 
Proceedings” (undated) http://www.macelree.com/the-legal-uncertainty-surrounding-the-disposition-of-frozen-embryos-in-
american-divorce-proceedings/ (accessed 2016-05-24).   
6 Breen-Portnoy “Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of Separation and Divorce: How Nahmani v Nahmani and Davis v Davis 
Form the Foundation for a Workable Expansion of Current International Family Planning” 2013 28(1) Maryland Journal of 
International Law 275 275–276 notes that the “Israeli and American jurisprudence on this issue, though limited, far outstrips the 
current international dialogue, particularly in regard to the issue of frozen-embryo disposition in cases of separation and divorce”.   
7 Breen-Portnoy 2013 28(1) Maryland Journal of International Law 276 notes that “the cryopreservation of embryos and the issue 
of their ‘custody’ are such recent innovations that international law has not yet caught up with medical developments”.   
8 See, eg, Davis v Davis 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v Kass 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); A.Z. v B.Z. 725 N.E.2d 1051 
(Mass. 2000); J.B. v M.B. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Reber v Reiss 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Szafranski v Duston 34 
N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).   
9 Mr Loeb, who initially filed a suit against Ms Vergara in 2014, was in 2015 allowed to amend his lawsuit, one in which he would 
seek full custody of his embryo daughters. See McCartney “Loeb vs Vergara Embryo Suit Gets Court Ruling” 22 May 2015 USA 
Today http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/tv/2015/05/22/loeb-vs-vergara-embryo-suit-gets-court-ruling/27800753/ (accessed 2016-
10-10). The hearing has been set down for January 2017. See Cook “A-list Clash over Embryos” 24 September 2016 BioEdge 
http://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/a-list-clash-over-embryos/12012 (accessed 2016-10-07).   
10 The reason for this may be because the agreement entered into between the clinic and the parties using their services is essentially 
one of consent. As such the primary focus of the clinic is on responsibilities and protecting itself from liability. In contrast, the 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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Mr Loeb further claimed that, as he was committed to the well-being of his two embryo 
daughters, he should be granted full custody as well as permission to bring them into the 
world at a time of his choosing. He added that Ms Vergara had breached their contract by 
“reneging on their verbal and written agreements to allow the birth of the embryonic 
children conceived”.11 
 
In this dispute essentially two issues arise. The first relates to the “Form Directive” used 
by the reproductive centre. This document did not make provision for a donation option 
in the event that the parties decided not to utilize the embryos, and nor did it provide for 
those instances where the parties separate.12 Loeb alleged that this violated California law 
which requires that couples be given the following options for the disposition of their 
embryos in the event of their separation: the embryos should either be made available to 
the female or male partner, be donated for research purposes, or to another couple or 
disposed of in any other clearly-indicated manner.13 This argument will be dealt with 
below.  
 
The second issue pertained to the test to be applied in these instances. Up until this point 
a “balancing test” had been applied, one which weighs the interests of one gamete donor 
against that of the other. Loeb made the argument that the Court should consider a third 
interest, namely, that of the state in potential life.14 He alleged that:  
 
“the United States Supreme Court has held that this is a valid interest and that it exists 
from the moment of conception.”15 
 
The California Supreme Court has also recognized this interest.16 Evidence in support of 
this argument can be found in both California State law and federal law. 17  Loeb’s 
argument is thus that:  
 
“where there is [a] disagreement over what should be done with embryos, this interest 
should create a presumption in favour of the person who wants to bring them to term.”18 
 
In essence, Loeb’s petition asked nothing from Vergara – except the ability to allow the 
embryos they conceived together to come into the world.19 Whether this is a legally-
                                                                                                                                                                
future of frozen embryos is between the parties who opt to fertilize and freeze the products of this union. In this respect, the clinic is 
merely giving effect to an existing agreement.   
11  Hendershott and Cavello “The Real Costs of the Infertility Industry” 16 June 2015 The Catholic World Report 
http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/3955/The_Real_Costs_of_ the_Infertility_Industry.aspx (accessed 2016-10-06).   
12 This is currently the position in South Africa. Few clinics make provision for this option.   
13  Cromwell “What Nick Loeb’s New Action against Sophia Vergara means” 26 May 2015 The Federalist 
http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/26/what-nick-loebs-new-action-against-sophia-vergara-means/ (accessed 2015-07-10).   
14 Ibid.   
15 See, eg, Webster v Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 (1989) 519, where the United States Supreme Court recognized 
“the State’s interest in protecting potential human life” and saw no reason why this interest should only be recognized from the time 
the foetus becomes viable.   
16 See fn 13 above.   
17 Cromwell 26 May 2015 The Federalist http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/26/what-nick-loebs-new-action-against-sophia-vergara-
means/ notes that “[t]he California legislature has recognized that unborn children have potential interests, and therefore enacted 
Cal. Civ. Code § 43.1, which states that ‘[a] child conceived, but not yet born, is deemed an existing person, so far as necessary for 
the child’s interests in the event of the child’s subsequent birth’”.   
18 Ibid.   
19 See fn 13 above.   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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permissible argument on his part will also be considered below. But first it is necessary to 
briefly explain the biology that gives rise to disputes of this nature.  
 
3 A brief introduction to artificial reproduction  
When parties decide to engage in artificial reproduction with the specific purpose of 
producing embryos for future use, gametes – that is, the male and female reproductive 
cells – are donated or extracted and fertilized in vitro.20 The fertilized gametes are now 
known as a zygote, which is the term used to describe the fertilized organism from the 
moment of fertilization until four days thereafter.21 It is at this point that the zygote 
becomes a blastocyst. This stage occurs between five and nine days after fertilization. It is 
during this period that implantation into the uterine wall takes place. It is also during this 
stage that the blastocyst or pre-embryo is frozen for future use.22  Once this occurs, 
embryonic development is interrupted until the pre-embryo is thawed and implanted into 
the uterus. At approximately 14 days after fertilization – interruptions not included – the 
blastocyst becomes an embryo and for the next six weeks the embryonic cells continue to 
develop until they form a foetus. What is evident from this is that at the stage of freezing 
the pre-embryo is not yet a foetus, which is an important consideration in reaching a 
definitive solution on this issue.23 
 
4 The South African legal position  
At present the ownership of embryos is regulated by the Regulations Relating to Artificial 
Fertilisation of Persons (Regulations),24 promulgated in terms of the National Health Act 
(NHA).25 The other legislation that may potentially weigh in on this issue is section 
12(2)(a) of the Constitution, which will be considered below.  
 
4 1 The Regulations  
The law concerning artificial fertilization is set out in the Regulations, which endeavour to 
regulate all processes dealing with artificial fertilization.  
 
Regulation 18 specifically deals with the issue of the “[o]wnership of gametes, zygotes and 
embryos”.26  This regulation states that once artificial fertilization has occurred, “the 
ownership of a zygote or embryo … is vested in the recipient.”27 
 
This provision is problematic for two reasons. Regulation 18 fails to make mention of 
those instances where embryos are being cryopreserved for future use. In this instance 
fertilization has taken place, but it is possible that no one is a “recipient” as defined in the 
Regulations. In those instances where no such person has been nominated, the 
Regulations fail to provide an answer.  
                                                 
20 This is an ART procedure that involves spontaneous fertilization of an egg and sperm cell outside the human body. See the 
Definitions in the Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons, GN 175 in GG 35099 dated 2012-03-02.   
21 Robertson “In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos” 1990 76 Virginia LR 437 441.   
22 Robertson 1990 76 Virginia LR 443.   
23 The status of the embryo under South African law is still uncertain, although it is clear from existing legislation that the foetus 
and embryo are treated differently. For example, under SA law, terminations of pregnancy are permitted more easily during the first 
trimester when the procreative tissue is an embryo, than when it is a foetus.   
24 See fn 20 above.   
25 61 of 2003.   
26 Author’s own emphasis.   
27 Reg 18(2).   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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The second problem relates to the use of the term “ownership”. “Ownership” has been 
defined in numerous Court decisions as: 
 
“the most complete real right which gives the owner the most complete and absolute 
entitlements to a thing”.28 A thing in turn has been defined as:  
 
“as a corporeal or tangible object external to persons and which is, as an independent 
entity, subject to juridical control by a legal subject, to whom it is useful and of value”.29  
 
These definitions, when read alongside Regulation 18, suggest that gametes and embryos 
qualify as property. Such an interpretation raises the following question: Was this the 
intention of the legislature? If so, then the framing of Regulation 18 makes sense, as 
ownership generally vests in the person in possession of the property. And does such an 
interpretation mean that South African law has definitively excluded the possibility that 
an embryo is neither a person nor something in-between person and property, which 
requires special consideration? I submit not. Mahomed et al appear to agree when they 
assert that:  
 
“our current legislation does not provide guidance on whether an embryo may fulfil the 
requirements to be property. Therefore, the exact characterisation of an embryo in South 
African law remains unknown”.30 
 
They further agree that the use of the word “ownership” in the Regulations is problematic 
and suggest that it should be “substituted with a ‘proprietary interest’, which denotes 
something different from the legal understanding of ownership”.31 
 
From the aforementioned it becomes apparent that the Regulations are of limited 
assistance in resolving the issue of embryo disputes. Whether section 12(2)(a) provides 
any insight into this situation will be considered next.  
 
4 2 Section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution  
Section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution recognizes the right of individuals to make decisions 
regarding reproduction. This right has been interpreted as affording individuals the 
freedom to avoid procreation. This position has been confirmed in both case law and 
statute. For example, in both the Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of 
Health cases32 the Court recognized the application of the right in section 12(2)(a) within 
the context of a termination of pregnancy. Similarly, the preambles of both the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act33 and the Sterilisation Act34 affirm their connection to 
                                                 
28 Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 5ed (2006) 39–47.   
29 Ibid.   
30 Mahomed, Nothling-Slabbert and Pepper “The Legal Position on the Classification of Human Tissue in South Africa: Can 
Tissues be Owned?” 2013 6(1) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 16 19.   
31 Ibid.   
32 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T); 2005 (1) SA 509 (T). In the first case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, while in the second case the Court considered whether a girl under the age of 18 years, in exercising 
her rights in s 12(2)(a) could terminate her pregnancy without parental consent.   
33 92 of 1996.   
34 44 of 1998.   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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section 12(2)(a). Sadly, no similar connection has been made between the section 12(2)(a) 
and the right to reproduce, either sexually or artificially.35 The status of this “right” is thus 
unclear. At present section 12(2)(a) therefore does not aid parties wishing to procreate 
under these circumstances.36 Courts may thus rule in favour of avoiding procreation, 
which translates into the disposal of embryos where disputes arise. This position is 
untenable as choosing to procreate is as much a part of self-determination as choosing to 
avoid procreation. This begs the question: how should South Africa proceed? What 
follows is an examination of legal disputes in other jurisdictions in order to find possible 
solutions.  
 
5 Foreign case law  
5 1 G and G (Australia)  
In G and G37 the Western Australian Family Court was called upon to decide the fate of 
six frozen embryos which had been created by a couple whose relationship had since 
broken down. At the time of cryopreservation the female was suffering from 
endometriosis which required treatment that would prove harmful to her existing ova. 
The dispute arose because Mrs G wanted the embryos discarded, while Mr G, who 
believed this to be his only remaining opportunity to procreate,38 wanted them to be 
transferred into his custody. His intention was not to use them personally, but rather to 
donate them to an infertile couple. However, prior to freezing the embryos, the couple 
had signed an agreement in which they indicated that the frozen embryos were to be 
discarded in the event of their separation.  
 
The Court, in reaching its decision referred to both Australian law39 on the subject as well 
as foreign decisions40 involving similar circumstances. The Court found that:  
 
“[t]he embryos should be allowed to succumb as the parties have now separated and can 
no longer achieve the purpose for which they consented to create and use the embryos”.41 
 
This case clearly followed contract principles despite the husband’s allegation that he had 
no further opportunities to procreate. In this instance the Court appears not to have 
attached much weight to his assertion, as he was not the one suffering from 
endometriosis. This case raises the question whether such an assertion by the wife would 
have produced a different result.  
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Academics such as Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 286 provide limited insight into the meaning of 
“making decisions regarding reproduction” under s 12(2)(a) and whether it extends to the decision to procreate.   
36 Parties could at best rely on s 14 of the Constitution to assist them. This provision recognizes that “[e]veryone has the right to 
privacy”. This provision is arguably a variation of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (1950) which has aided parties in vindicating their rights to reproduce artificially.   
37 [2007] FCWA 80.   
38 G and G supra par 21.   
39 Reference was in particular made to s 26(1)(a) of the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991.   
40 The Court (par 44) amongst other referred to the English case of Evans v Amicus Health Care Ltd; Hadley v Midland Fertility 
Ltd [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam), [2004] 2 WLR 713 (Eng) where the two female applicants sought permission to use the embryos 
created with their partners after the relationships had terminated. In both instances the British High Court dismissed the 
applications, finding that “the men had an unconditional statutory right to withdraw or vary their consent”.   
41 G and G supra par 61.   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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5 2 Findley v Lee (USA)  
In Findley v Lee42 the dispute involved the disposition of embryos created by the parties 
after the wife had been diagnosed with breast cancer. In this case the parties had entered 
into an agreement with the IVF programme in which they clearly indicated that, in the 
event of divorce, the embryos were to be destroyed. Dr Lee disputed the agreement, 
alleging that:  
 
“her informed consent was not properly obtained and that a balancing test should be 
applied in which her constitutional right to procreate should trump”.43  
 
The Court ultimately found in Mr Findley’s favour, ostensibly vindicating “his right not to 
procreate despite [his] ex-wife’s infertility”.44 In its decision the Court made a number of 
important observations. It rejected the argument that either party’s right to procreate or 
not to procreate was implicated.45 It further ruled that both parties had “waived their 
rights by entering into the contract and making their elections in the event of divorce or 
death.”46  
 
The Court also addressed the issue of whether embryos are property or persons. It found 
as follows:  
 
“To suggest that this Court should find that these five ‘viable’ embryos are simply property 
undermines not only the express language in the Consent & Agreement, but ignores the 
very reason couples undergo the emotionally and financially draining process of IVF: To 
have a child.  
 
It simply is not necessary in this case to categorize the embryos as ‘life’ or ‘property.’ The 
reality is that the embryos and their creators, Lee and Findley, deserve something more 
nuanced … the embryos in this case represent the nascent stage of five human lives. They 
are not property, nor are they fully formed human beings. They are, in the construct of the 
law, sui generis and will be deemed as such in this statement of decision.”47 
 
While this decision followed a contractual approach it provided great insight into the 
arguments raised by the parties in similar disputes. Fortunately for the Court, there was a 
pre-existing agreement which could be relied upon. Matters are more complex when no 
such agreement exists. 
 
5 3 Davis v Davis (USA)  
In Davis v Davis,48 the plaintiff filed for divorce from his wife. While the parties were able 
to reach an agreement regarding the terms of the dissolution of their marriage, they were 
unable to do so regarding the seven embryos stored in a fertility centre. This case 
                                                 
42 No FDI-13-780539 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2016).   
43 Crockin “California Trial Upholds Couple’s Agreement with UCSF and Orders Pre-embryos Discarded” 16 December 2015 
ASRM News https://www.asrm.org/California_Trial _Court_Upholds_Couples_Agreement_with_UCSF_and_Orders_Pre-
embryos_Discarded/ (accessed 2016-08-20).   
44 Cohen and Adashi “Embryo Disposition Disputes: Controversies and Case Law” 2016 46(5) Hastings Centre Report 13 14.   
45 Findley v Lee 65.   
46 See fn 43 above.   
47 Findley v Lee supra 82.   
48 Davis v Davis supra 588.   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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proceeded “through three levels of the Tennessee judicial system”, with each Court 
arriving at a different conclusion.49 
 
The trial court awarded custody to Mrs Davis, finding that the embryos were “human 
beings”.50 The appellate court reversed this decision and awarded joint-custody to both 
parties. It reasoned that Mr Davis had a “constitutionally protected right not to beget a 
child where no pregnancy has taken place.”51 
 
Furthermore, the Court found “no compelling State interest to justify ordering 
implantation against the will of either party”.52 The Supreme Court of Tennessee began its 
analysis by attempting to clarify the legal status of the pre-embryos. It concluded that the 
pre-embryos were not persons or property, but in a special category that deserved “special 
respect because of their potential for human life”.53 Therefore, based on their interest in 
(rather than their ownership of) the pre-embryos, the parties had decision-making 
authority over its disposition.54 Next, the Court discussed whether the parties will become 
parents. The Court examined the right to privacy and concluded that “the right of 
procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance – the right to 
procreate and the right to avoid procreation”.55 After balancing these two conflicting 
constitutional interests, the Court concluded that Mr Davis’s interest in avoiding genetic 
parenthood outweighed his ex-wife’s right to procreate by donating the embryos to 
another couple. 56  The Court, however, noted that it would have reached a different 
outcome if Mrs Davis had wanted to use the embryos herself and had no other means of 
achieving parenthood. 57  The Court commented that any proposed state interest in 
preserving the life of the embryo “is at best slight,” reasoning that:  
 
“when weighed against the interests of the individuals and the burdens inherent in 
parenthood, the State’s interest in the potential life of these pre-embryos is not sufficient 
to justify any infringement upon the freedom of these individuals to make their own 
decisions as to whether to allow a process to continue that may result in such a dramatic 
change in their lives as becoming parents”.58 
 
This dictum in Davis thus puts paid to the argument advanced by Nick Loeb. This case is 
further significant as it was the first to:  
 
“attempt to lay out an analytical framework for disputes between divorcing couples 
regarding the disposition of frozen embryos”.59  
 
                                                 
49 Stempel “Procreative Rights in Assisted Reproductive Technology: Why the Angst?” 1999 62(3) Albany LR 1187 1192.   
50 Davis v Davis supra 589.   
51 Ibid.   
52 See fn 50 above.   
53 Davis v Davis supra 597.   
54 Ibid.   
55 Davis v Davis supra 601.   
56 Davis v Davis supra 604.   
57 Ibid.   
58 Davis v Davis supra 602.   
59 Kass v Kass supra 178.   
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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This ruling suggests that the approach to be followed in such disputes is to firstly 
determine whether there is an agreement. If there is, it should be considered as valid and 
binding. Where, however, no such agreement exists, the court must resolve the dispute by 
weighing the interests of both parties.60 In such a case, avoiding procreation should 
trump procreation, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving 
parenthood without having recourse to the embryos.61 
 
What is also evident from the Davis ruling is that personal use will trump donation to 
third parties in cases of a dispute. This was also the finding in Nahmani v Nahmani62 
which will be discussed next.  
 
5 4 Nahmani v Nahmani (Israel)  
In Nahmani v Nahmani, the parties decided to procreate by means of in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) after Mrs Nahmani had lost the ability to reproduce naturally. Their gametes were 
thus fertilized and stored, with the intention that they be implanted into a surrogate in the 
USA. Before this could happen, Mr Nahmani left home and fathered a child with another 
woman. Mrs Nahmani subsequently applied for the release of the embryos.63 The trial 
Court found in her favour, holding that Mr Nahmani’s prior agreement to IVF applied to 
all stages of the procedure.64 Furthermore, Mr Nahmani could not rely on a change in 
circumstances when he himself had prompted the change.65 
 
Mr Nahmani appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of Israel found in his favour, 
concluding that it would be improper to force parenthood on him.66 The Court further 
found that concluding otherwise would be a violation of Mr Nahmani’s human liberty and 
procreational autonomy.67 The Court added that contractually Mr Nahmani’s consent to 
continue with the IVF was unenforceable.68  
 
Mrs Nahmani repetitioned the Court. It reversed its previous decision and awarded the 
embryos to Mrs Nahmani.69 In doing so the Supreme Court found that her right to 
reproduce took precedence over Mr Nahmani’s right to avoid procreation.70 
 
What is interesting to note about this case is that, while the Court’s decision vindicated 
the right to procreate above the right not to procreate, this decision was heavily 
influenced by the fact that Israel is a pro-natalist state.71 Given its religious heritage Israel 
may in future reach similar decisions regarding the disposition of frozen embryos.72  
                                                 
60 Kass v Kass supra 179.   
61 Davis v Davis supra 604.   
62 CA 5587/93 Nahmani v Nahmani [1995–6] IsrLR 1 (hereinafter “Nahmani I”); CA 2401/95 Nahmani v Nahmani [1995–6] IsrLR 
1 (hereinafter “Nahmani II).   
63 Nahmani I par 3.   
64 Nahmani I par 4.   
65 Ibid.   
66 Nahmani I par 8.   
67 Ibid.   
68 Nahmani I par 30.   
69 Nahmani II 52.   
70 Nahmani II 66 (par 15).   
71 Pro-natalism is defined as “the policy or practice of encouraging the bearing of children, especially Government support of a 
higher birth rate”. See Dictionary.com (undated) http://www.dictionary.com/browse/pronatalist (2016-10-10).   
72 Waldman “Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development of and Regulation of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and 
Israel” 2006 16 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 65 68 notes that Israel is “unapologetically pro-natalist”. This particular 
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5 5 Szafranski v Duston (USA)  
In Szafranski v Duston73 the parties created embryos when the defendant was diagnosed 
with lymphoma which, as a result of her chemotherapy, would ultimately result in ovarian 
failure and infertility. The couple also entered into an agreement in which the plaintiff 
agreed that the defendant “should have the opportunity to use such embryos to have a 
child.” 74  Unfortunately, the agreement was never signed; and when the relationship 
ended, a dispute arose regarding the fate of the embryos. In this case the Illinois Appellate 
Court, adopting a combined contractual and balancing-of-interests approach, found in the 
defendant’s favour. As the agreement was an oral one, the Court abided by it, but 
simultaneously placed great emphasis on the fact that Ms Dunston would not be able to 
reproduce otherwise.  
 
In this case the existence of an oral agreement, as opposed to a written one, may explain 
the Court’s approach.  
 
5 6 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd (United Kingdom)75  
In 2002, the plaintiff, Ms Evans, instituted proceedings against the defendant, Amicus 
Healthcare, in an attempt to prevent it from destroying frozen embryos that she had 
created through IVF with her then boyfriend, Howard Johnston. Their relationship had 
terminated in 2002, and Johnston subsequently withdrew his consent for the embryos to 
be used. This act thus placed the defendant under an obligation to destroy them. Both the 
Family Division and the Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, including her 
claim that the defendant’s conduct would violate the embryos’ right to life. On appeal, the 
European Court of Human Rights 76  (ECtHR) unanimously dismissed Evans’s claim 
because the United Kingdom did not recognize embryos as human lives and, therefore, 
their disposal would not constitute a human-rights violations.  
 
In this case the ECtHR clearly rejected the argument that an embryo has a right to life. An 
embryo therefore does not qualify as a person. Despite this and other rulings, subsequent 
applicants have not been deterred from raising this argument.77  
 
5 7 Possible approaches to the disposition of embryos and their legal 
implications  
From the aforementioned discussion of foreign-case law it becomes apparent that 
disputes involving frozen embryos has to date been met with three responses: enforcing 
the existing contract, weighing up the interests of the parties, and determining the status 
of the embryo. Each will be discussed below.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
stance is the reason that a couple have been permitted to harvest their dead daughter’s eggs in the hope of producing grandchildren. 
See Conley “Israeli Court Allows Family to Harvest Dead Daughter’s Eggs” 11 August 2011 ABC News 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/israeli-family-permission-freeze-dead-daughters-eggs/story?id=14272156 (accessed 2016-08-19).   
73 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).   
74 Szafranski v Duston supra 504.   
75 [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam); [2004] 2 WLR 713 (Eng).   
76 Evans v United Kingdom 43 E.H.R.R. 21 415 (2006).   
77  Thomas More Society “Thomas More Asserts Scientific Fact: Embryos are Human, not Property” 1 December 2015 
https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/thomas-more-society-asserts-scientific-fact-embryos-are-human-not-property/ (accessed 2016-
08-20).   
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5 7 1 Enforcement of the contract  
The argument for the enforcement of the embryo-disposition agreement appears to be the 
simplest option. This option “allow[s] judges to decide cases based on contract principles 
rather than upon rights-based arguments”.78 However, this option is only available where 
an agreement in fact exists. However, even in such instance, this approach may not prove 
suitable where one party has changed its mind, or where the standard-form contract does 
not make provision for what should happen in a dispute.  
 
In the former instance, contract modification would then be impossible and one party 
may be bound to a contract that first, no longer reflects their wishes, and secondly, results 
in offspring which they no longer wish to beget and rear. Enforcement of the contract is 
thus only appropriate where the parties’ wishes have remained unchanged. Where this is 
not the case, recourse may be had to one of the following options:  
 
5 7 2 Weighing up the interests of the parties  
Where the agreement is silent on the issue of what should happen in the event of the 
parties separating, as was the case in the Vergara-Loeb saga, Courts have tended to weigh 
up the interests of the gamete providers in order to reach a decision. The interests in 
question are usually the interest of one party in reproducing versus the interest of the 
other party in avoiding procreation. The argument advanced by Mr Loeb adds another 
dimension to this option, namely, that the interest of the State in potential life also be 
considered. This argument suggests that in case of a dispute “the State’s interest should 
create a presumption in favour of the person who wants to bring the embryos to term.”79 
 
The challenge posed by this argument is that, where the State’s interest in potential life 
becomes a deciding factor in cases of this nature, it has the potential to make inroads into 
women’s rights to terminate their pregnancies, as the State could then arguably have an 
interest in every potential life created. For this reason alone this argument should be 
rejected.  
 
5 7 3 Determining the status of the embryo  
The third option in cases of embryo disputes – and by far the option most avoided – is an 
evaluation into the status of the embryo. To date three responses have emerged. The first 
views the embryo as a person.80 This argument is, however, problematic as the:  
 
“juridical nature of such a construction is objectionable: the legal status of juridical 
persons consists of both rights and duties. The embryo and fetus cannot be the bearer of 
duties”.81 
 
Adopting this view means that a court will invariably rule in favour of the party wishing to 
procreate.  
                                                 
78 See fn 5 above.   
79 See fn 13 above.   
80 Schonfeld “‘To be or not to be a parent’ The Search for a Solution to Custody Disputes over Frozen Embryos” 1998 15 Touro LR 
305 312.   
81 Slabbert “The Fetus and Embryo: Legal Status and Personhood” 1997 2 TSAR 234 253.   
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The second view expressed is that the embryo is not a person, but property. 82  The 
ordinary rules regarding property would then determine the right of a party to dispose of 
the embryos. The notion that embryos are property is often not well received.838 
 
The third view expressed is that embryos are neither persons nor property, but that they 
fall into an:  
 
“intermediate category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for 
human life. However, it is not clear whether this implies (a) that embryos are special 
property, able to be treated as objects of property rights but subject to constraints 
necessary to ensure respectful treatment, or (b) that embryos cannot be objects of 
property rights. If embryos are neither persons nor property, interactions with embryos 
must be regulated, if at all, through sui generis rules.”(footnotes omitted).84 
 
Each of the options discussed above brings with it a plethora of questions, some of which 
are subject to philosophical, legal and moral considerations. 
 
5 7 4 The legal implications of choosing one approach above the other  
Regardless of the approach adopted by a court, it comes down to recognizing the right of 
one party above that of the other. To date Courts have generally tended not to “allow the 
use of a frozen embryo if one party objects”.85 In doing so, these courts have sent the 
message that “the interest of the one who wishes to avoid procreation outweighs the 
interests of the one who wishes to procreate”.86  
 
Interestingly, this position is in contrast with jurisprudence dealing with termination of 
pregnancy. Prior to the advent of ART, in disputes involving the decision to reproduce, 
versus the decision not to do so, where a female was already pregnant and the male 
wished to avoid parenthood, the courts have unequivocally held that her right to bodily 
integrity outweighed the father’s right to decide.87 In these situations the one party’s 
interest in procreating thus outweighed the other’s interest in avoiding procreation.8888 
The tables thus seem to have been turned as far as ART is concerned.  
 
That said, this reversed stance appears to be the norm, except where the party wishing to 
procreate has no other opportunities to do so. This factor is increasingly impacting on 
court decisions in disposition cases and may well mean that procreating would trump the 
avoidance of procreation in certain instances.  
                                                 
82 See fn 80 above.   
83 One of the reasons for this is that such a notion makes “human appear as a commodity”. See Mahesh “Law and Regulations 
Associated with Ownership of Human Biological Material in South Africa” 2015 8(1) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 
11. The Court in Findley v Lee supra 82 was also not willing to acknowledge that embryos are property, as doing so would devalue 
their worth to their creators.   
84 Davis v Davis supra 597; Bennett Moses “The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells to Cyberspace” 2008 
30 Sydney LR 639 642.   
85  Green “New Case Bodes Well for Sofia Vergara in Frozen Embryo Battle” 22 November 2015 MSNBC 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/new-case-sofia-vergara-frozen-embryos (accessed 2016-05-25).   
86 Schonfeld 1998 15 Touro LR 321.   
87  Colb “Verdict – Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia: Frozen Embryo Disputes” 23 December 2015 Justia 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/23/frozen-embryo-disputes (accessed 2016-08-17).   
88 The reason for this change in stance can possibly be attributed to the fact that termination of pregnancy involves not only a right 
to decide but also control over one’s body, or as Colb https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/23/frozen-embryo-disputes puts it “[the] 
right to be free of an assault and battery on one’s body”.   
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In the event of a court either recognizing the embryo as a person or finding that the 
interest in procreating outweighs the interest in avoiding procreation, some questions are 
raised regarding the consequences of such decision. Mr Loeb implied that he wanted 
nothing from Ms Vergara other than her eggs. In reality, parenthood – whether desired or 
not – brings with it certain responsibilities that cannot be ignored.  
 
The first question that thus arises relates to the status of the party who wants to avoid 
procreation. Is that party to be given the status of a donor which denies them parental 
responsibilities and rights? Or is that party to be treated as an unmarried parent who has 
obligations towards the life created? In most countries a sexual relationship that results in 
offspring as a minimum requires an unmarried parent to maintain the child. The child 
also has inheritance rights where the parent is deceased. Would the same apply in this 
instance? Or does the fact that the embryo was created artificially have some bearing on 
this situation? Even in the case where the parent wishing to avoid procreation is regarded 
as a donor, the child still has a right to know its genetic origins, which potentially has 
some ramifications for the donor.89  
 
Clearly, disputes over frozen embryos raise a lot of questions. Even after examining the 
experiences in foreign jurisdictions, it becomes evident that some of these questions 
remain unanswered. This raises a further question about how South Africa should 
navigate what at present constitutes uncharted territory. 
  
6 The way forward for South Africa  
As pointed out, South Africa’s current legal framework is inadequate for dealing with 
disputes involving frozen embryos. However, the jurisprudence from the other 
jurisdictions discussed in this paper point to three possible ways of remedying this defect. 
The first, and by far the easiest option, would arguably be to ignore the issue until a case 
arises which necessitates a response. Unfortunately, this is not ideal as courts often have 
different approaches on how matters of this nature are to be decided. This is evident from 
the foreign-case law on this issue. So, until this issue is addressed by either the Supreme 
Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court, conflicting approaches are likely to result.  
 
The second option, and the preferable response, would be to amend legislation to provide 
greater clarity on the options available to the parties. Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act90 is 
dedicated to surrogate-motherhood agreements. It is suggested91 that similar legislation 
be adopted to cater for embryo-disposition agreements. This legislation should, amongst 
other, include the following:  
 
                                                 
89 In some countries the fact that donors’ identities are no longer anonymous has deterred individuals from donating their gametes. 
See, eg, Clark “A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor-conceived Children to Know Their Biological Origins” 2012 40(3) Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 619 643; Skopek “Anonymity, The Production of Goods, and Institutional Design” 
2014 82 Fordham LR 1751 1804.   
90 38 of 2005.   
91 Cohen and Adashi 2016 46(5) Hastings Centre Report 16–17 propose similar guidelines for legislation in the USA.   
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 A clear distinction should be made between an agreement concluded with a fertility 
centre which provides for informed consent and an embryo-disposition 
agreement.92 
 The agreement must be in writing.  
 The agreement must be concluded prior to cryopreservation.93 
 These agreements should be binding even if one party later changes his/her 
mind.94 
 The agreement should clearly indicate the various options available to the parties,95 
as well as the option selected by them.  
 Provision should also be made in the event where one of the parties suffers a loss of 
fertility and the embryos thus represent their last opportunity for procreation.96  
 The agreement should also stipulate the legal obligations to be imposed, if any, on 
the other gamete donor. For example, where the female donor acquires the 
embryos, the legal obligations of the male donor in respect of any children born 
should be stipulated.97 
 It could be argued that the agreement should be confirmed by the High Court as is 
the case with surrogate-motherhood agreements. However, it is submitted that this 
is not necessary as a third party such as a surrogate is not involved, and there is 
thus a smaller possibility of exploitation than in the case of surrogacy which 
necessitates confirmation by the High Court.  
 
Failing this, the third option would be for fertility centres to formulate a contract, or for 
the clients themselves to reach an agreement, which makes express provision for the 
disposition of embryos in the case of separation or divorce.98 Like the first option, this one 
is also not preferred as some of the points raised in option two may be omitted, which 
could then potentially also result in litigation.  
 
7 Conclusion  
The ideal solution to addressing disputes involving frozen embryos is an embryo 
disposition agreement. Where such agreements exist, preference should then be given to 
them. In the alternative, the interests of the parties should be balanced. However, in order 
for either option to be feasible, legislation should ideally exist which sets out the contents 
of these agreements. In the alternative, some sort of clarity should be reached about the 
status of the right to reproduce vis-à-vis the right not to reproduce. In Davis v Davis the 
Court held that “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal 
                                                 
92 A distinction is necessary as the former agreement is between the clinic and the donors, while the latter is between the parties. 
The clinic only becomes involved in the disposition agreement where the parties have decided to donate or discard the embryos and 
need assistance in doing so.   
93 This is much the same as a surrogacy agreement which must be concluded before fertilization takes place. This adds to certainty 
between the parties. Cohen and Adashi 2016 46(5) Hastings Centre Report 17.   
94 Ibid.   
95 Namely, that the embryos be donated to the female donor, the male donor, third parties, research or that the embryos be 
discarded.   
96 See fn 93 above.   
97 Ibid. In theory, the agreement could stipulate that the other gamete donor be treated as an independent donor, without any 
parental responsibilities and rights.   
98 At present Reg 10 makes provision for the destruction of embryos if they have not been claimed after ten years have passed. Such 
a situation may arise where the parties are unable to reach consensus regarding the disposition of their embryos and which to avoid 
litigation. However, such a lengthy time period may be untenable for parties whose relationships have terminated soon after 
cryopreservation has occurred. In the absence of an agreement litigation may then be their only option.   
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significance – the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation”.99 Up until now, 
the right to avoid reproduction has been clearly recognized. A similar finding about the 
right to reproduce is lacking. This may mean that in the absence of an embryo-disposition 
agreement, where courts are called upon to balance the interests of the parties, the party 
wishing to avoid procreation will always triumph, leaving the party wishing to procreate 
with the short end of the stick. 
 
 
                                                 
99 Davis v Davis supra 601.   
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